

Ensuring Election Integrity for Tennessee Voters

September 1, 2021



#### OUR PURPOSE TODAY

- Who we are.
- The problems: A quick summary of election integrity research findings.
- <u>The solution -- A model</u>: A safer, more secure, comprehensive voting model that bolsters integrity in Tennessee elections.
- Highlight best practices to replace issues we've uncovered.

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#### WHAT WE'VE DONE

- Reviewed reports about machines, ballots, voting processes, <u>nullification of legislators and voting laws</u>, court cases, Big Tech/media censorship.
- Evaluated affidavits, data presentations, documentaries, Dominion user
- Interviewed poll workers.
- Attended open meetings.
- Presented our findings to legislators, government officials and the public.



#### **OUR CONCLUSIONS**


- Issues in our 2020 election -- suspect state-wide similarities:
- Increased security risks caused by voting system machines vulnerabilities:
- Overconfidence in a weak, limited audit process: 1 of 3 functions;
- Dependency on a software vendor; did we outsource the election?
- Can't audit 70% of Tennessee counties due to no paper ballots.
- System security standards older than first smart phone and being ignored.
- election process (June 2021 Democracy Fund Voter Survey). (59%) believe permanent harm has been done to the US as a result of the 2020 Confidence in voting has been severely damaged -- Nearly 6 in 10 Americans
- Tennesseans now don't trust our elections process; open meetings
- We believe Tennessee elections are at risk.




ISSUE ONE:

ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINES CAN BE HACKED.










SO, WHAT IF WE DEVELOPED A BEST PRACTICE, COMPREHENSIVE, WORKING VOTING MODEL TO FIX THESE AND OTHER ISSUES ....?

.....IT WOULD LOOK LIKE THIS





## (1) BE MORE AGGRESSIVE WITH VOTER ROLL INTEGRITY

- Increased citizen moves in/out of state... integrity efforts should be aggressive.
- address records; and Williamson County obituaries. BUT do deeper dive on Service National Change of Address (NCOA) System; Department of Safety Change list maintenance program to at least annual: Continue: US Postal the rolls:
- Develop minimum voter registration software standards and check for functionality:
- Data logic checks;
- Fraud detection and pattern analysis







## (1) BE MORE AGGRESSIVE WITH VOTER ROLL INTEGRITY

- Add innovative resources beyond the basics for monthly checks:
- E-Verify: 8 USC§1373(c): Fed gov MUST respond to state/local officials' request to determine immigration status of individuals;
- U.S. Immigration Services SAVE;
- Social Security's Master Death File;
- County tax records; residence vs. commercial address,
- Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI).







## (2) SECURE THE <u>VOTER REGISTRATION PRECINCT PROCESS</u>

- Return to precinct-based voting vs. Voting Centers for both Election Day and Early Voting.
- Keep registration software, but go offline for early voting, day-of-election.
- Eliminate the need for an internet connection for day-of-vote registration:
- Which prevents hacking and real-time monitoring of all voting;
   Thus, preventing cheaters from knowing how many voters are
- Thus, preventing cheaters from knowing how many voters are left in precinct that can vote during and after Early Voting; so
   You can halt nefarious attempts to insert enough Election Day

votes via the technology to change election outcomes.









### (4) ... COUNTED BY OPTICAL SCANNERS

- Quickly counts all paper precinct/absentee ballots and tallies results.
- Scanner software/hardware will have been checked via Security Risk Evaluation
- Separate process independent of the vendor.
- Only one optical scanner & one backup needed per precinct.
- · Current Dominion optical scanners allow self-adjudication.
- All precinct tallies must be verified to County totals and, then, to State certification totals.





## (5) WITH A MANDATORY, POST-ELECTION ENHANCED RISK LIMITING AUDIT OF PAPER BALLOTS TO SUBSTANTIATE THE MACHINE COUNT.

- Helps verify with minimal cost -- that the winner won.
- Statistical, random sample, hand-counted, end-2-end, ERLA.
- 99% confidence with 1% hand-counted ballots in a 2% margin race.
- If numbers of ballots don't match, implement hand recount of ballots.
- Higher confidence audit vs. partial (BMD tabulator or recount) audit.
- The randomized number on ballot helps access ballots in audit sample
- Update TCA 2-20-103 to achieve this extra security; in process. Checks tallies from registration, precincts and county-to-state results.







### AMONG ELECTION COMMISSION OPERATIONS STATEWIDE. (6) ...AND AN OPERATIONAL AUDIT OF EFFECTIVENESS/ EFFICIENCY OF ACTIVITIES TO ENSURE ELECTION INTEGRITY

- Evaluates the effectiveness/durability of election integrity procedures, systems and training @ county level to include, but not limited to:
- Voter identification, registration and maintenance; chain of ballot custody; voter-to-voter ballot controls, transparency and oversight, mandatory audits; election & scanner
- State Election Coordinator selects 20% of Tennessee counties annually for this certification; compliance with state and federal laws and operational security.
- This audit + ERLA cover all county recommendations from NASS Task Force on audit, cycling through all counties in a 5-year period. Independent auditor audits.

Vote Verification: Post-election Audit Recommendations







#### TRACK SUCCESS OF THE PILOT PROGRAM. IMPLEMENT KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI'S) TO

- Adjudication percentage.
- Ease of adjudication.
- Success of Enhanced Risk Limiting Audit.
- Any validated fraud opportunity found in the model's implementation.
- Customer intercept survey.



WICH WILLIAMSON COUNTY VOTERS
FOR ELECTION INTEGRITY

IF WE AREN'T ABLE TO GET ALL OF THESE COMPONENTS... THEN THERE'S A LOT OF ISSUES TO ADDRESS.



## SECURITY RISK EVALUATION - VERSUS RECERTIFICATION -- OF VOTING & REGISTRATION MACHINERY

- TEC subcommittee has committed to recertify all 5 brands.
- Recommend: Security Risk Evaluation of all brands vs. recertification.
- standards. (2015)(2021) Create Minimum Voting System Requirements? None of five voting machine brands are certified beyond the 2005 VVSG 1.0
- Evaluate voting equipment and registration equipment.
- Establish bi-partisan independent citizen committee to identify, fix, replace
- Include credentialed data/internal/process control experts and IT/ cybersecurity experts. But NO vendors



## MACHINE CERTIFICATION PROCESS EXCEPTIONALLY WEAK

- With no public debate, EAC recently, secretly, approved guideline changes requested by machine manufacturers that reduce manufacturers' cost and Election Assistance Commission (EAC) oversees vendor election integrity efforts substantially weakens the security of voting systems, such as:
- Allow wireless networking devices in machines.
- Jessica Bowers (Dominion/TEC/Willco) oversees certifications for EAC
- Vendors do their own cyber reviews, then Voting System Testing Lab (VSTL) checks against the 2005 standards.

Only 2 VSTLs accredited to do certifications; ProV&V: unsecure website.



# MACHINE CERTIFICATION PROCESS EXCEPTIONALLY WEAK

The Dominion Result Tally and Reporting (RTR) system (per manual):

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- local file... with no dual-party authentication required; from secure removable media and replacing them with data from a Allows for mass vote changing by deleting results previously entered
- Reports can be published to "Public" transfer points inferring that there is at least an indirect connection to the internet.
- Remote clients can communicate with the server through Dominion... again interring a network connection.

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### VOTER ROLL DATA INTEGRITY IS CONCERNING

- Counts don't match: Reconciliation between SoS stats & WillCo voter history Bad data implies potential database integrity issue: garbage in=garbage out.
- Individual voter registration ID numbers appear to be assigned sequentially with evidence of reuse/reassignment over time shows a potential 269 more ballots cast than reported in WillCo.
- One voter registered in 2021 has a general election vote history in 2020.
- Estimated 100-101% voter registration of 18+ population on 11/3/20
- One team member found five extra voters between two addresses.
- WCEC Voter Maintenance needs to be active, not passive.



### VOTING CENTERS ARE AN OPENING FOR FRAUD

- Early Voting locations and Voting Centers require <u>poll books connected to</u> the internet with VPN to prevent duplicate, multiple check-ins by the same
- Tech allows malicious actors the ability to monitor voting activity real-time (number voted, number left to vote, specific voters who have voted, etc.)
- Lose control of precinct-level data and ability to more quickly identify fraud
- VPNs, other tech can be hacked; (T-Mobile; Marriott; Colonial Pipeline, Yahoo, Facebook, Twitter...) Why take a chance?



### WITHOUT SECURITY, FAKE BALLOTS CAN BE INSERTED

- Allegations of pristine absentee ballots into the count in several states
- Supported by numerous affidavits.
- Halderman affirms that ballot security must be improved.
- Cannot depend on vendor-supplied ballots.



## BALLOT MARKING DEVICES HAVE ISSUES - EXAMPLES:

- BMDs can be hacked, misconfigured or contain malware.
- BMDs actually create longer voting lines and cost twice paper ballots.
- BMDs rely on voters detecting ballot error, yet only 5-7% voters find and
- BMDs can show one thing on the screen but print something different.
- Voters understand BMDs aren't trustworthy; don't want the technology.



# WEAK AUDITS YIELD FALSE ELECTION CONFIDENCE... AUDITS ARE THE ONLY WAY TO TRULY CHECK ELECTION RESULTS

### 70% of counties are not even audited.

- Of those audited, only 1 of 3 process functions are examined.
- Gives a false positive, over-confidence with the election audit
- The audit should be end-2-end and answer these questions:
- Ballot scan code represent voter's vote? (Voter intention > vote cast)
- Tabulator correctly record, count the ballot? (Vote cast > vote count)
- Report system correctly tally tabulator votes? (Vote count > vote tally)



## ENSURE MACHINE AND VOTING PROCESS ISSUES REPLACED WITH BEST PRACTICE SOLUTIONS STATEWIDE

- Our deep dive in Williamson County revealed issues.
- Believe many of these issues are common with other Tennessee counties
- Three categories of solutions:
- Technological solutions;
- Process solutions;
- Legislative solutions.



### ENSURE MACHINE AND VOTING PROCESS ISSUES REPLACED WITH BEST PRACTICE SOLUTIONS STATEWIDE -- EXAMPLES TECHNOLOGICAL

Passwords managed by users & required change on first login and if compromised. All system users should have separate UIDs, forced changes.

#### **PROCESS**

County election officials must ensure sufficient resources/staff are trained to operate election system fully, without machine vendor presence or interaction with the system.



# ENSURE MACHINE AND VOTING PROCESS ISSUES REPLACED WITH BEST PRACTICE SOLUTIONS STATEWIDE -- EXAMPLES

Audits recommendations will require legislation

## National integrity sources 25 General Best Practices, including:

- Election laws/regulations can't be changed within 180 days prior.
- No automatic voter registration; no day-of-vote registration.
- No drop boxes ease of tampering; no chain of custody.

Ballot counting continues without pause until all votes tabulated.

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IN SUMMARY



#### WHAT WE RECOMMEND

- Paper ballots: Hand-marked, random sequenced, watermarked.
- Voter rolls: Make them more secure.
- Precinct voting: No voting centers, no online check-in.
- Enhanced Risk Limiting Audit: Post-election, end-2-end validation vote count.
- Chain of custody: Ballots/precincts/County/State totals, physical accountability.
- Operational audit: Annual state audit of county election commissions.
- Security Risk Evaluation: Of all voting side & registration side machinery
- Our Goal: Ensuring Election Integrity.



Ensuring Election Integrity for Tennessee Voters

June 2, 2021